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What we perfect in Gittin v. New b 1 D states: Article Information If you have any means or suggestions regarding our precision policy, please contact us via such frontal or by finding a question in writing to us at: This is because appellee's agency works was designed on the view that a work cannot lodge a negligence free against his own something. So, if appellants were perfect with the delay in guest of the Great, they enjoyed no links to obtain them.

See also Toscano v. On this basis, we are satisfied that summary judgment was not warranted. Moreover, regardless of whether a principal-agent relationship existed between the decedent and Keefer, we believe that the court erred in granting summary judgment. This is because appellee's agency theory was premised on the view that a principal cannot lodge a negligence claim against his own agent. We disagree with that position. In Slutter, Md. The trial court granted a directed verdict against the mother on the ground that the daughter was contributorily negligent as a matter of law, and her negligence was imputed to the mother.

The doctrine of imputed negligence rests on the presumption that the non-driving owner had the right to control the vehicle. The agency doctrine, on Free sex dating in hancock md 21750 other hand, rests on the relationship of the parties and the nature of the expedition during which the accident occurred. Imputed negligence, like agency, is based on the relationship, but turns on the facts in respect of the right to control, whereas the agency theory applies where it is pertinent, irrespective of the momentary right of physical control. In short, the agency doctrine is predicated on a status rather than on inference of fact. Further, the Court observed: Slutter is distinguishable from the case at bar, Bengali gril pitchar. This is because it involved a suit by an owner-passenger against a third party, notwithstanding the negligence of the person driving the owner's car.

Here, we have a suit that derives from a passenger's claim against the driver of her own car, not a claim against a third party. It recognizes that there are circumstances when a principal may sue an agent for negligence. Interestingly, illustration 5 gives the following example: P's servant, A, negligently drives P's automobile with P as a passenger and collides with T, who is negligently driving another automobile. The Court of Appeals rejected the driver's argument. Quoting from Powers v. The Knapp Court explained that the doctrine of imputed negligence originated in response to public policy considerations.

Prosser, The Law of Torts at 3d ed. Bluntly put, it is felt that, since automobiles are expensive, the owner is more likely to be able to pay any damages than the driver, who may be entirely impecunious; and that the owner is the obvious person to carry the necessary insurance to cover the risk, and so to distribute any losses among motorists as a class. These considerations are not present in a suit by the owner-passenger against the driver, however. In the circumstances here present we see no reason for the application of the presumption [that the driver] urges.

The ordinary rules by which primary negligence and contributory negligence are determined seem, to us, to be wholly adequate. We shall not, therefore, undertake a detailed discussion of the cases in which the imputation of negligence, on whatever theory, has been invoked. For an exhaustive comment thereon see a note in 27 Md. Homer, supra, [ Md. It will be noted that in all of those cases, up to and including Slutter, a third party was present. Although Knapp expressly addressed and rejected only the presumption of imputed negligence in a suit by a passenger-owner against the authorized driver, the logic and rationale of Knapp apply here.

In our view, agency principles do not, as a matter of law, necessarily defeat the claim of an owner-passenger who sues his or her driver for injuries caused by the driver's negligence. In other words, even if an agency relationship existed between the decedent and appellee because of the rebuttable presumption that the driver of the decedent's car was the decedent's agent, this would not have precluded the decedent, had she lived, from suing the driver for his negligent driving. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. In view of the foregoing, we are persuaded that the trial court erred to the extent it granted summary judgment in favor of appellee based on an agency theory. Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk Appellants argue that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment based on the doctrines of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.

They argue that there was insufficient evidence to show that the decedent knew Keefer was a minor, or was intoxicated, and no evidence that the decedent appreciated the risk of danger. Further, appellants posit that reasonable minds could differ about whether the proximate cause of the accident was Keefer's speed or his state of intoxication or both. Howard Street Jewelers, Md. The burden of proving contributory negligence rests on the defendant. A plaintiff in Maryland who is contributorily negligent generally cannot recover in a suit against a defendant.

The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff's negligence was a cause of the plaintiff's injury. Ordinarily, the issue of contributory negligence is a question of fact for the jury to resolve. What we said in Campbell, 73 Md. As we explained in McSlarrow v. The standard of care to be used in measuring contributory negligence is the conduct of an ordinarily prudent person under similar circumstances; and even if the act done turns out to be an error of judgment, this alone does not make the act negligent if an ordinarily prudent person may have made the same error.

The elements of the affirmative defense of assumption of the risk are equally well settled. The defendant must show: Page Keeton et al. In analyzing the affirmative defenses on which appellee relies, we observe that Keefer has not referred us to any case in which the court granted summary judgment on the ground that the driver's consumption of alcohol, as a matter of law, defeats a suit initiated by a passenger who had also been drinking or who authorized the driver to operate the vehicle, notwithstanding that the driver had been drinking. In our research, we have found several Maryland cases in which the defendant contended at trial that the plaintiff's suit was barred due to the plaintiff's contributory negligence or assumption of risk in riding as a passenger when the driver was under the influence of alcohol.

We perceive it significant, however, that in each case the issues of contributory negligence or assumption of risk were resolved at trial, not by way of a pre-trial motion. The case of Baltimore County v. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the passenger's family, the county and its driver appealed, but the driver of the vehicle in which the decedent had traveled did not appeal. The appellants claimed, inter alia, that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the issues of assumption of risk and contributory negligence. Specifically, they argued that, as the driver was under the influence of alcohol when he and his passenger proceeded in the driver's car, the passenger knew or should have known that the driver was intoxicated.

Therefore, the passenger either assumed the risk or was contributorily negligent in riding in the vehicle. Ultimately, the Court agreed with the appellants that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury as to assumption of risk or contributory negligence on the part of the decedent. In reaching its holding in Keenan, the Court relied on the case of Powers v. Reynolds, supra, Md. On the evening of the accident, Powers, Coffman, Coffman's wife, and the decedent drove to a night club where they all consumed alcohol. When the group left the club, Powers realized he was not in a condition to drive.

Therefore, he entered the back seat and Coffman took the wheel. On their way home, an accident ensued; the decedent was thrown from the vehicle and killed. After the jury rendered a verdict against the defendants, they appealed. The defendants argued that the trial court erred by: It [has been] contended that [the passenger] was guilty of contributory negligence because of a voluntary assumption of risk. The test in determining voluntary assumption of risk is whether there was an intentional and unreasonable exposure to danger, which the plaintiff either knew or had reason to know. A guest is not negligent in riding with an intoxicated driver, if he is unaware of the intoxication or does not notice any facts which would arouse the suspicions of a person of ordinary prudence.

If a driver's unfitness is not discovered until after the car is on a lonely road in a part of the country with which the plaintiff is unfamiliar, particularly if late at night, it may be the part of prudence to remain in the car, unless the driver is so incompetent or reckless that a reasonable man would recognize that there was a great likelihood of an accident. It has been repeatedly held that a guest is not contributorily negligent as a matter of law in riding in an automobile, after he and the driver have been drinking together. The case of Bliss v. There, four teenagers spent most of the afternoon and evening drinking together.

As they were driving home, the driver of the vehicle in which they were riding veered off the road and struck a tree, killing one of the passengers. A surviving passenger sued the driver, alleging negligence. Although the jury found the driver negligent, the jury rendered a verdict for the driver on the ground that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of danger of the driver's actions. On appeal, the plaintiff complained, inter alia, that the court erred in allowing the jury to consider the defense of assumption of risk.


We rejected the plaintiff's contentions. Rather, relying on Keenan, supra, Md. The evidence included medical records indicating that the driver's blood alcohol level was. We Frwe several important points from the cases discussed above. First, as we said, in these kinds of cases the issues of contributory negligence and assumption of risk are generally resolved by a jury. Free sex dating in hancock md 21750, none of the cases suggests that, as a matter of law, a passenger's claim against an intoxicated wex automatically fails if there is any evidence showing that datingg passenger knew that the driver had been Free sex dating in hancock md 21750.

We are particularly troubled here because: But, a 27150 need not believe appellee's testimony, even if it is uncontradicted. See also Impala Platinum Ltd. Stated otherwise, the death of the only other eyewitness does not mandate a judgment in appellee's favor. To the contrary, the jury could determine that appellee's account is nothing more than a self-serving attempt to blame the victim, who unfortunately cannot refute what the sxe might perceive as unsubstantiated, convenient accusations. Given the circumstances attendant in this wrongful death and survival action, the presumption of due care in favor of the decedent has particular significance.

Although neither party has addressed the presumption, we believe that the court erred in awarding summary judgment based on contributory negligence, because of the presumption that the decedent exercised due care for her own safety. Castranda, supra, Md. Recently, in McQuay v. Schertle, supra, Md. In McQuay, the decedent had parked her car at a marine terminal in the path of a tractor carrying eight tons of wood pulp. When the tractor operator spotted the decedent's vehicle, he stopped suddenly, causing the cargo to topple onto the vehicle. The decedent was crushed to death by the cargo. The jury found the driver of the tractor negligent and it also found the decedent contributorily negligent.

Although we reversed on other grounds, we concluded that the trial court properly submitted the issue of contributory negligence to the jury, and did not err by failing to instruct on the presumption of due care. In analyzing the jury instructions, Judge Byrnes, writing for the Court, thoroughly explained the presumption of due care: When the decedent's conduct at the time of the accident is in dispute and his actions cannot be established by evidence other than his own obviously unavailable testimony, the presumption of due care fills the evidentiary void created by his absence.

In that way, the presumption levels the playing field in those cases in which the decedent's conduct is under attack but, as a consequence of the accident itself, he is unable to defend himself. To some extent probability is involved: Because people usually do not act so as to cause themselves harm, it is probable that the decedent was not putting himself in danger at the time of the accident; therefore, if by magic the decedent could be made to reappear and testify about what he had been doing immediately before the accident, his testimony probably would tend to show that he had been acting carefully, and thus would counter the defendant's evidence of contributory negligence.

In the appropriate hancick, the jury may consider the presumption in place of that missing testimony. The Datign cases in which an instruction on the presumption datinh been approved are those in which the presumption has been needed Freee ameliorate the unfairness hanfock about by the loss of the decedent's testimony. Like the presumption against a spoiler of evidence, the presumption of due care is rooted in the notion that one should not benefit from the elimination of unfavorable evidence. By the time the jury in a death by accident case 21705 Free sex dating in hancock md 21750 the issue of contributory negligence, it has already concluded, necessarily, that the defendant was negligent in the happening of the accident in which the decedent was killed.

Fairness Frre that in the absence of other evidence to show the conduct of the decedent immediately prior to the accident, and when that conduct is in dispute, the defendant should not be permitted to benefit in proving contributory negligence by the inability of the decedent to testify about his own conduct. By contrast, in those Maryland cases in which an instruction on the m has been disapproved or the refusal to so esx has been approvedthere either has not been a need to level the playing field-because the conduct of the decedent prior to the accident has not been in dispute-or there has Fgee other evidence FFree that issue, usually in the form of eyewitness testimony.

Free sex dating in hancock md 21750 the conduct of the decedent in McQuay was in dispute, we held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give the presumption of due care instruction, because evidence was presented that compensated for the absence of the Michael angarano he dating testimony, including the testimony of the passenger who was in the vehicle with the decedent and another eyewitness to the accident. Indeed, the testimony of those witnesses, particularly that of [the passenger, who observed the accident first hand but survived to tell about it] not only filled the evidentiary gap created by [the decedent's death] but also did so from her vantage point.

McQuay is readily distinguishable from this case. Here, appellee, as the lone survivor, is the only one who is able to provide an account of the events that led to the collision; there are no other eyewitnesses to the actual events. Thus, unlike in McQuay, there is no eyewitness testimony to compensate for the absence of Rebecca's version of what happened. As we have seen, appellee casts blame on the victim for buying the liquor, knowingly furnishing it to appellee even though he was underage, and for instructing Keefer to drive her car when she allegedly knew he was unfit to do so.

Apart from appellee's self-serving statements, which a jury never had the chance to evaluate, and the decedent's position in the vehicle, the record is virtually devoid of any evidence regarding the decedent's conduct or the state of her knowledge at the relevant time. For example, appellee did not present any evidence as to his behavior just before he took the wheel, in order to show that it would have been evident to the decedent that he was unfit to drive. Further, no evidence was offered explaining the significance of appellee's blood alcohol level of. And, as we have seen, no blood alcohol tests were conducted on the decedent; that type of medical test might have helped to establish the veracity of appellee's version of events.

Moreover, that the decedent asked Keefer to drive arguably suggests that she realized only that she was unable to drive. All persons having any objection to the appointment or to the PrObate of the decedent's will shall file their objections with the Register of Wills on or before the 6th day of May, Any person having a claim against the decedent must present the claim to the undersigned personal representa- tives or file it with the Register of Wills with a copy to the undersigned on or before the earlier of the following dates: Notice is given that Rita M. Palmer, Great Cove Rd.

Further information can be obtained by reviewing the estate file in the office of the Register of Wills or by contacting the personal representatives or the attor- ney. Any person having a claim against the decedent must present the claim to the undersigned personal representatives or file it with the Register of Wills with a copy to the undersigned on or before the earlier of the following dates: Malott, Register of Wills for Washington County 24 Summit Ave, Room Hagerstown, MD pdth Obituary policy Obituaries of the resi- dents of Hancock and immediate area, or those with close relatives or strong local ties here, will be printed for free by The Hancock News as a public service.

Obituaries must be provided by a licensed funeral home. A photo of the deceased will also be printed if furnished by the family. All obituaries will be edited to conform to the newspaper's style. Unedited obituaries may be published as advertise- ments. For details, contact The Hancock News at Silica Tonoloway Project operations. The proposed installation will be located at Woodmont Road, Hancock, Maryland Pursuant to Sectionof the Environment Article, Annotated Code of Maryland, the Department has made a tentative determination that the Permit to Construct can be issued and is now ready to receive public comment on the applica- tion.

Copies of the Department's tentative determination, the application, the draft permit to contstruct with conditions, and other supporting documents are available for public inspection. Requests for a public hearing must be submitted in writing and must be received by the Department no later than 20 days from the date of this notice. Written comments must be received by the Department no later than 30 days from the date of this notice. Further information may be obtained by calling Ms. Shannon Healey at They will be disposed of in accordance to law within 3 weeks of this notice if no rightful claim is made.

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